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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a Judgment rendered by the honorable Homer Wilkinson in
favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees, Daniel Armstrong, Jared Armstrong and Taylor Armstrong
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Armstrongs" or "Plaintiffs") for special and
general damages against Defendant/Appellant, Glen C. Pickett ("Pickett"). The Utah
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3)0) and Utah Const, art VIII, §§ 1 & 3.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
This appeal involves the following five issues:
Issue #1:
Whether Daniel Armstrong should have been allowed to pursue and recover for
property damage to a vehicle he did not own and which was not registered to him.
Standard of Review
"The issue of standing is primarily a matter of law, reviewed for correctness."
H.J., M.J., andJ.M. v. State of Utah, 986 P.2d 115,120 (Utah App. 1999) (citing
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997)). Trial court's
factual findings that bear on standing, however, are reviewed with deference.
Nevertheless, "[b]ecause standing involves important policy considerations, appellate
courts 'will closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set of facts fits
the legal requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the trial court/" Id

6

Preservation of the Appeal
This issue was preserved for appeal when Pickett, through his attorney, challenged
Daniel Armstrong's standing to pursue the property damage claim during the Hearing
conducted on Plaintiffs' damages ("the Damages Hearing")1 (R. 587 Transcript at 41, 4849 and 99-100) and in Pickett's two Briefs Regarding Plaintiffs' Damages ("Pickett's
Damages Briefs") (R. 287-88 and 535).
Issue #2:
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l) provide unsecured individuals who have been
declared by the trial court in default with partial tort immunity for general damages when
the claimant does not meet the threshold requirement.
Standard of Review
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of a statute is
correction of error. Ong Ml, Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d447, 455 (Utahl993).
Preservation of the Appeal
This issue was preserved for appeal at the Damages Hearing where, after
extensive argument and the submission of relevant case law, Judge Wilkinson ruled that
the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) are affirmative defenses
and do no apply when the defendant cannot assert them because he has been defaulted.
(R. 578 Transcript at 5-19).
1

A transcript of the proceedings of the Damages Hearing is included in the Record
starting at p. 578 and the references to that transcript will, hereinafter, be referred to as "R. 578
Transcript" followed by references to specific page numbers.
7

Issue #3:
Whether Daniel Armstrong's self-serving testimony, unsupported by any medical
evidence and in fact refuted by the medical evidence, that the accident aggravated a preexisting back injury was sufficient to support the trial court's determination of his special
and general damages.
Standard of Review
Factual findings of a trial court can only be set aside when clearly erroneous and
due regard should given to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 5, f 17, 994 P.2d 817, 821. "When a
reasonable basis exists for the trial court's award of damages, [the appellate court] will
affirm the damage award on appeal." Id (citing Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); and Breinholt v. Breinholt,
905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App.1995)). Nevertheless, "[a] finding is clearly erroneous if it
is 'against the clear weight of evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Cal Wadsworth Const v.
City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) (citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
Preservation of the Appeal
The issue was preserved for appeal in Pickett's Damages Briefs (R. at 284-87 and
534-35) and at the Damages Hearing (R. at 391-94) where the lack of any causation
evidence connecting Dan Armstrong's claimed back pain to the January 7, 1996 accident
8

and the total absence of evidence regarding the necessity or reasonableness of an
executive chair claimed as a medical device and a spa membership were highlighted for
the Court.
Issue #4:
Whether two small, almost imperceptible, scars below Jared Armstrong's jaw-line
constitute "permanent disfigurement" as that term is used in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22309(1) and, if so, whether those scars support the general damages awarded by the trial
court.
Standard of Review
Questions about whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given
rule of law are mixed questions of law and fact. Appellate Courts "review the underlying
empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard" but the legal effect of those facts
!

is the province of the appellate courts, and no deference need be given a trial court's

resolution of such questions of law."' Drake v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 939 P.2d 177,
181 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994).
If that issue is resolved against Pickett, the sub-issue regarding whether the
evidence supports the trial court's award of general damages must be reviewed using a
clearly erroneous standard of review. See discussion of this standard of review for Issue
#3 Supra and Issue #5 Infra.

9

Preservation of the Appeal
The issue regarding whether Jared's two minor scars constituted permanent
disfigurement as that term is used in U.C.A. § 31A-22-109(l) was preserved for appeal
during the Damages Hearing when the threshold requirements of that statute were argued
and the trial court ruled that because of Pickett's Default, the Plaintiffs' failure to meet
those threshold requirements would not prevent them from pursuing claims for general
damages. R. 578 Transcript at 5-19. The issue regarding the excessiveness of Jared's
general damages was preserved for appeal in Pickett's Damages Briefs. R. at 288 and
535-36.
Issue #5:
Whether the opinion of Plaintiffs1 expert (based upon a single evaluation
conducted over three years after the accident) that Taylor Armstrong, suffered a closed
head injury which might impact him in the future, without more, was sufficient to
support the trial court's finding that Taylor sustained general damages of $350,000, or
whether that amount is speculative and based on conjecture in light of testimony from the
expert that he could not say with any degree of medical certainty what the impact of that
head injury would or might be.
Standard of Review
The appellate court should view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment of the trial court, and the trial court's findings should not be disturbed unless
there is no substantial evidence to support them. Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982
10

(Utah 1986) (citations omitted). This issue should be decided utilizing the clearly
erroneous standard of review. See also Standard of Review for Issue #3 Supra.
Preservation of the Appeal
This issue was preserved for appeal in Pickett's Damages Brief. R. at 288291and 536-39.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l) states:
A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause
of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to
have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has
sustained one or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings.
This case arose from a traffic accident which occurred on January 7, 1996, when
the vehicle being operated by Pickett traveled through a stop sign and struck a vehicle
occupied by the Armstrongs. R. 578, 29-30. Following that accident Daniel Armstrong
(the father), Jared Armstrong (a son), and Taylor Armstrong (a minor son), by and
11

through his mother, all filed suit, alleging that they were "grievously injured and suffer
from impairments and disability resulting from injuries they incurred when the vehicle in
which they were traveling was struck by the vehicle driven by defendant Pickett." R. at
1-2. While liability was contested, the major issues before the trial court dealt with the
nature and extent of the Armstrongs' injuries and damages.
During discovery Pickett failed and refused to appear and allow his deposition to
be taken. Plaintiffs filed a Motion with the trial court seeking to have Pickett's Answer
stricken and a Default Judgment entered. Plaintiffs' Motion was granted (R. at 138) and
the Damages Hearing was then conducted on October 16, 2000. SeeR. 578 Transcript.
At the Hearing, Pickett's counsel argued that before any of the Armstrongs could
pursue claims for general damages they had to produce admissible evidence that they
met the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (l)(a)-(e).2 R. 578
Transcript at 5-19. The trial judge, however, ruled that the threshold requirements of
U.C.A. 31A-22-309(l) provide defendants with an affirmative defense, which would not
be available to Pickett because his answer had been stricken. R. 578 Transcript at p. 19,
lines 19-23.
The following individuals testified at the Damages Hearing: police officer Julia
Jorgensen [beginning R. 578 Transcript at p. 21]; toxicologist, Dennis J. Crouch
[beginning R. 578 Transcript at p. 24]; Daniel Armstrong [beginning R. 578 Transcript
2

The threshold requirements of U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l) are death; dismemberment;
permanent disability or impairment based on objective findings; permanent disfigurement; or
medical expenses per person over $3,000.
12

at p. 29]; Lorene Armstrong, [beginning R. 578 Transcript at p. 62] and received
arguments from counsel. Additionally, a binder marked "Plaintiffs Exhibit l"3 was
admitted without objection as to the form or foundation of the information contained
therein with objections regarding the admissibility and relevance of the documents and
information contained therein being reserved. R. 578 Transcript at p. 21.
At the close of the Hearing, Judge Wilkinson requested written Memoranda
specifically addressing Plaintiffs'damages. R. 578 Transcript at 108-109. The
Armstrongs filed their Damages Brief October 31, 2000. R. at 180-263. Pickett's
Damages Brief was then filed on November 27, 2000. R. at 283-405. Judge Wilkinson,
however, was dissatisfied with the size and volume of information contained in the
Briefs that had been submitted and ordered the parties to submit revised Memoranda
containing a more simplistic itemization of the claimed damages. The parties, therefore,
prepared and submitted revised briefs. R. at 525-545.
On January 2, 2001, the trial court issued a Minute Entry, awarding special,
general, and punitive damages to Daniel Armstrong, Jared Armstrong, and Taylor
Armstrong. R. at 548. The award to Daniel included $2,884.97 in special damages,
$10,000 in general damages, and $5,000 in punitive damages. Daniel was also awarded

3

Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 contained records Tabbed A through R [Bate Stamp pp. 1 through
607, comprising medical records of the plaintiffs, school records of Taylor Armstrong, and
several depositions, including the deposition of Erin Bigler, Ph. D.; records marked S through V
[Depositions of Daniel Armstrong, Lx>rene Armstrong, Jared Armstrong, and Scott Leroy Smith,
M.D.], and records marked W, X and Y [Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatories and Property Damage Receipts].
13

property damages ($27,357.49 for the vehicle plus $2,573.89 in "add-ons"). Id. The
award to Jared included special damages of $2,778.78; general damages of $10,000; and
punitive damages of $5,000. Id. The award to Taylor included $2,569.63 in special
damages, $350,000 in general damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages. Id.
Thereafter, the court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment
against Pickett consistent with the court's Minute Entry. R. at 550-62.
The court improperly awarded Daniel Armstrong damages to a vehicle which he
did not own. In order to pursue a claim for property damage evidence of ownership must
be presented. There was no evidence presented in this case that Daniel Armstrong had
any ownership interest or right in the vehicle that was damaged in the accident and the
trial court's award to him for that property damage should be overturned.
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l) prohibits plaintiffs from pursuing claims for
general damages unless they meet one or more of the requirements set forth therein. The
trial court, however, ruled that this bar to the recovery of general damages did not apply
in this case because it had entered Pickett's Default. That ruling is contrary to the plain
language and intent of the statute as well as well established case law that 309(1)
provides individuals that comply with Utah'sfinancialresponsibility laws with partial
tort immunity from claims for general damages unless the injured individual meets the
threshold requirements.

14

Even if Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 does not preclude the recovery of general
damages in this case, the evidence submitted on behalf of Daniel Armstrong, Jared
Armstrong and Taylor Armstrong was insufficient to merit the trial court's award.
Daniel did not provide any medical testimony regarding his injuries and failed to
link his physical complaints to the accident by admissible evidence. The scarring, upon
which Jared's general damages were based was minimal, unobtrusive and virtually no
impact whatsoever upon his life. The general damages awarded for that insignificant
scarring were excessive. Finally, the trial court's award of $350,000 in general damages
to Taylor Armstrong was speculative and based upon conjecture. Plaintiffs expert
testified that Taylor had sustained a head injury, but he could not testify to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that it would impact him in the future. He testified generally
about the difficulties that some people with head injuries can face, but he could not say
what adversities Taylor would likely face. Without at least some evidence about the
future impact of an injury upon a plaintiff, an award based upon future problems that are
possible but not probable is speculative and should not be allowed to stand.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

On January 7, 1996, the Armstrongs and Pickett were involved in a motor

vehicle accident at the intersection of 3100 South and 4800 West in West Valley City,
Utah. Plaintiffs Exhibit l 4 , Bates Stamp p. 1.
4

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 was not paginated by the District Court Clerk for this Appeal and
will be referred to hereafter as "Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1" with specific references to the Bate Stamp
page numbers.
15

2.

At the time of the accident the Armstrongs were in a 1992 Chevrolet

Suburban, owned by Lorene Armstrong ("Lorene's vehicle"). Id., Bates Stamp p. 4.
3.

Pickett's vehicle struck Lorene's vehicle just behind the driver's door. Id.

4.

Lorene's vehicle was "totaled" as a result of the collision. See Affidavit of

Daniel Armstrong, R. at 208 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp pp. 277-278.
5.

Daniel, Jared and Taylor filed suit against Pickett seeking to recover

specific and general damages for injuries they received in that accident. R. at 1-2.
6.

Because Pickett failed and refused to appear to allow his deposition to be

taken, the trial court struck Pickett's Answer, and entered his default. R. at 138.
Thereafter a Hearing on Damages was held R. 578 Transcript.
7.

After the Damages Hearing, the trial court entered a judgment awarding

Daniel special damages of $27,357.49 for the total loss of Lorene's vehicle, even though
he did not own that vehicle and even though Lorene Armstrong was not a named
plaintiff in the action.5 R. at 561,11.
8.

Daniel admitted, in his Damages Brief and attached affidavit, that he and

Lorene had been fully compensated for the value of Lorene's vehicle through payments
totaling $27,157.49 by Atlanta Casualty (Pickett's insurance company) and by USF&G's
(the Armstrong's insurer). R. at 182 and 209.

5

While Lorene was a party to this litigation in a representative capacity as the guardian for
Taylor, a minor child, she did not seek recovery for any of her losses or damages.
16

9.

The trial court found that the accident had aggravated Daniel's pre-

existing back injury. R. at 552, f 8.
10.

The following portions of the record contain evidence supporting the trial

court's finding that Daniel's lower back injury had been aggravated:6
a.

R. 578, Transcript, Bate Stamp pp. 30-35, 40, 45-48 (Testimony of

Daniel Armstrong at the Damages Hearing, Oct 16, 2000).
b. Plaintiffs Exhibits 3 and 5. (Summary of medical and related expenses
for Daniel Armstrong and chiropractor's note.)
c. Plaintiff s Exhibit 1, Tab A Bates Stamp p. 4. (West Valley City Police
Dept. Witness Form).
d. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab D Bates Stamp pp. 83-90 (Pioneer Valley
Hospital records); 93, 97 (records of Scott Smith, M.D. and Glen Fuller, M.D.); 3 (1118-97 Radiology Report); 108-111 (Health Insurance Claim Form, Radiology bills,
orthopedic chair invoice); Tab P 522 (Medical History).
e. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab S (Deposition of Daniel Jon Armstrong,
October 9, 2000, p. 5, lines 6-19; pp.7, beginning line 23- p. 14, line 25; p. 17, lines 310; p. 37, line 15 through p. 39, line 1; p. 44, lines 18-22).
f. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab T (Deposition of Lorene Armstrong, October
9, 2000, p. 18, line 18 through p. 20, line 10).

6

Copies of the cited portions of the Record and Exhibits which could support the trial
court's findings have been submitted in an addendum to Pickett's Brief.
17

g. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab V (Deposition of Scott Leroy Smith, M.D.,
October 12, 2000, p. 17, line 8 through p. 18, line 8; p. 25, lines 12 through p. 26, line
17; and pp. 28-29).
11.

Although the trial court awarded Daniel less than $3,000 in special

damages, and made no explicit factual finding that he was permanently disabled or
impaired based on objective findings, as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309 to
recover for general damages, the trial court nevertheless awarded him $10,000.00 in
general damages. R. at 550-562.
12.

The evidence upon which the award of general damages to Daniel could be

based is set forth in paragraph 10 and in Plaintiffs' Damages Briefs [R. at 180-182,193205 and 525-26] which includes numerous references to other verdicts and settlements
from "The Rocky Mountain Verdicts and Settlement Services9'for allegedly comparable
claims. Pickett objected to the use of allegedly comparable verdict and settlement
information and moved to have it stricken because it was never placed before the court at
the hearing and because it was inadmissible evidence that was irrelevant and unreliable.
R. at 281-282 and 406-411. The trial court did not ever rule on Pickett's objection and
Motion to Strike, but did request other Memoranda be filed. This inadmissible evidence
would also support the trial court's award.
13.

Jared sustained TWO puncture lacerations near his left jaw-line. Plaintiffs

Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp pp. 119-120; 122, (Pioneer Valley Hospital ER Records, 1-7-96);
148 (photograph).
18

14.

On July 18, 1996, Dr. Jed R. Bindrup performed revision surgery to correct

FOUR small scars (8 x 5mm; 9 x 4mm; 10 x 4mm; 4 x 9mm) along Jared's jaw line and
left cheek. Id., pp. 138-140.
15.

Despite Dr. Bindrup's surgical efforts, the scars along Jared's left jaw line

could not be completely removed, and are still visible under certain lighting conditions
and when his skin is stretched. R. 148 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab U (photograph),
attached to Telephone Deposition of Jared Armstrong, October 9, 2000.
16.

The trial court awarded Jared less than $3,000 in special damages, and did

not make any factual finding that he was permanently disfigured, as would be required by
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 for a general damages award. The trial court did,
however, award him $10,000 in general damages. R. at 553-554 and 561.
17.

The following portions of the record contain evidence that could support

the trial court's conclusions:
a. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab F Bates Stamp pp. 119-120; 122, 129-132
(Pioneer Valley Hospital ER Records, 1-7-96); p. 148 (photograph); and pp. 135,137140, 144-148 (surgical records of Dr. Jed Bindrup and photographs).
b. Deposition of Jed Reed Bindrup, October 3, 2000 (found in Plaintiffs
Exhibit 1, Tab L beginning Bates Stamp p. 371) pp. 5-14 and 22-24.
c. Deposition of Jared Troy Armstrong, October 9, 2000 (found in
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab U), pp. 4-9 and 11.
d. R. 578 Transcript, pp. 35-36; and p. 73.
19

18.

The evidence upon which award of general damages to Jared could be

based is set forth in the preceding paragraph and in Plaintiffs' initial damages brief [R. at
183-84, 211-17 and 526-527] which includes numerous references to other verdicts and
settlements from "The Rocky Mountain Verdicts and Settlement Services9'for allegedly
comparable claims. Pickett objected to the use of allegedly comparable verdict and
settlement information and moved to have it stricken because it was never placed before
the court at the hearing and because it was inadmissible evidence that was irrelevant and
unreliable. R. at 281-282 and 406-411. The trial court did not ever rule on Pickett's
objection and Motion to Strike, but did request other Memoranda be filed. This
inadmissible evidence would also support the trial court's award.
19.

Taylor was also injured in the traffic accident. He experienced a brief loss

of consciousness at the scene and sustained abrasions to his face. He was diagnosed with
cuts, bruises and a mild concussion. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp pp. 217-220
20.

On June 29, 1999, Taylor was examined by clinical neuropsychologist Erin

David Bigler, Ph.D., who opined that Taylor had more likely than not sustained a mild
traumatic brain injury on January 7, 1996. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 459.
21.

When asked about the future impact of the alleged mild brain injury Dr.

Bigler testified as follows:
Q:

Do you know what Taylor's permanent problems are going to be at this
point in time?
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A:

I don't know exactly what Taylor's problems will be. As a group,
children who have these problems can end up with less education,
end up with less job sophistication.

Q:

Can you say whether Taylor will end up there? Do you have an
opinion about that?

A:

I can't tell you that.

(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at Bate Stamp p. 453)
Dr. Bigler was also asked:
Q:

So it's your understanding when you saw [Taylor] in 1999 he was
worse off, mentally, than he was before the accident?

A:

Well, no. You have to be careful how you say that, because even
though he was behind, he was still at second-grade level, which is . .
. He wasn't in the second grade when he had the head injury.
So, you know, it was not that he was worse, but he was behind
where he should be, given his age.

Q:

So let me see if I understand this correctly: It's your opinion that the
accident caused him to move backwards and get behind where he was?

A:

His age-made peer; that's correct.

Q:

And then his progression from that point is he's remained behind his peers,
but continued to progress?

A:

Correct.

Q:

And that will continue in the future?

A:

We know, regardless of whether this is a brain injury or idiopathic learning
disability, that certain skills do get better over time. They may stay behind,
and they may plateau earlier than what is normally the case, but they
usually do get better until somewhere in mid-puberty; and then you have
this absolute leveling off, and a plateau that is reached that is
insurmountable thereafter.
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Q:

And there's no way to tell what that plateau will be for Taylor?

A:

Well, there is.

Q:

Right Now?

A:

Not right at this point. I mean, you really, truly, have to follow these kids
for several years, to be absolutely definitive of where that's going.

Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at pp. 455-456.
22.

In spite of the above testimony the trial court found that Taylor's injuries

"will, in all probability, limit his success in college and obtaining one of the higher
paying jobs in our economy." and that Taylor "will always be behind in his development
in relation to his peers." R. at p. 555, f 40; p. 556, f 42.
23.

The trial court also found that Taylor had sustained a total of $2,569.63 in

special damages and general damages of $350,000. R. at p. 556ffif43 and 46.
24.

The following portions of the record contain evidence that could support a

finding by the trial court that Taylor was permanently impaired as a result of the accident
of January 7, 1996:
a. R. Transcript 578 p. 36, beginning line 10 through p.38, line 14; p. 44,
beginning line 19 through line 25; p. 49, beginning line 23 through p. 52, line 13; p. 53,
beginning line 14 through p. 60, line 2; p. 63, beginning line 8 through p. 73, line 8; p.
74 through p. 77, line 9; p. 77, beginning line 15 through p. 89, line 18.
b. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab H Bates Stamp pp. 213, 217-222 (Pioneer
Valley Emergency Dept. Records); pp. 250-258 (Reports and records of Erin D. Bigler,
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Ph. D.); p. 259 (Records of Dr. Scott Smith and Dr. Glen Fuller); Tab M pp. 422- 474
(Deposition of Erin David Bigler, October 4, 2000); and Tab R pp. 583-607 (school
records of Taylor Armstrong).
c. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab S (Deposition of Daniel Jon Armstrong,
October 9, 2000), p. 17 through p. 23, line 10; p. 35, beginning line 22 through p. 37,
line 2; p. 38, lines 15-17, p. 39, lines 15-22.
d. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab T (Deposition of Lorene Armstrong, October
9, 2000), p. 6, beginning line 4 through p. 16.
e. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab V (Deposition of Scott Leroy Smith, M.D.,
October 12, 2000), pp. 9, line 17- p. 10, line 13; p. 12, line 3 through p. 15, line 8.
f. October 23, 2000 Vocational and Rehabilitation Report by MGD
Management, Inc., R. at p. 219-228.
g. October 25, 2000 letter of Robert H. Wilde of Paul A. Randle
Associates. R. 230-253.
24.

The evidence upon which award of general damages to Taylor could be

based is set forth in the precluding paragraph and in Plaintiffs' initial damages brief [R.
at 184-189 and 219-2637] which includes numerous references to other verdicts and

7

In addition to information from Rocky Mountain Verdict and Settlements about other
cases contained in Plaintiffs' initial Damages Brief [R. at, 255-263], it also contained a
"Vocational and Rehabilitation Report" dated October 23, 2000 (one week after the damages
hearing) [R. 219-228] and a Draft Copy of an Economic Loss Evaluation dated October 25, 2000
(9 days after the damages hearing) [R. at 230-253], neither of which were presented discussed at
the damages hearing.
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settlements from "The Rocky Mountain Verdicts and Settlement Services"Tor allegedly
comparable claims. Pickett objected to the use of allegedly comparable verdict and
settlement information and moved to have it stricken because it was never placed before
the court at the hearing and because it was inadmissible evidence that was irrelevant and
unreliable. R. at 281-282 and 406-411. The trial court did not ever rule on Pickett's
objection and Motion to Strike, but did request other Memoranda be filed. This
inadmissible evidence would also support the trial court's award.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Daniel Armstrong Damages for the
Loss of an Automobile He Did Not Own.

Because Daniel Armstrong did not have any ownership interest in Lorene's
vehicle and because full compensation had already been received from insurers, Daniel
Armstrong should not have been allowed to sue for damage to that property. Rule 17 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest." Courts have held that for one to be a real party in
interest, and thus to have standing to bring an action for injury to real property, one must
allege ownership, lawful possession, or right to possess the property in question.
Friendly Village v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co, 107 Cal Rptr 123 (Cal. App. 1973) (holding
that condominium association had no standing to sue for property damages suffered by
condominium owners because they were not title-holders and thus not the real parties in
interest). See also, Am. Jur. Parties, § 30 ("One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
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of the court... unless one has an individual or representative capacity some real interest
in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter
of the controversy").
In this case, the registered owner of the vehicle in question was Lorene
Armstrong. See Plaintiff s Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 4 (West Valley Police Dept. Traffic
Accident Witness and Exchange Form). The Complaint does not allege that Daniel
Armstrong had any ownership interest in Lorene's vehicle, that he had title to the vehicle
or the right to possess it.. SeeR. 1-3. Without title, proof or even any allegation of
ownership or the right to possession, Dan Armstrong could not be the real parties in
interest entitled to sue for damages to the vehicle. He had no standing to sue for such
damages and it was improper for the trial court to award those damages.
Moreover, once an insurer has paid for damages, the insurer ordinarily becomes
the real party in interest by subrogation. See Haueter v. Peguillan, 586 P.2d 403,404
(Utah 1978). Daniel admitted, in his Damages Brief and attached affidavit, that he had
been fully compensated for the value of the vehicle through payments totaling
$27,157.49 from Atlanta Casualty (Pickett's insurance company) and USF&G's, the
insurers of Lorene's vehicle. R. at 182 and 209. Therefore, the insurance companies are
the real parties in interest with respect to the property damage to Lorene's vehicle. The
trial court's award of $27,357.49 (R. at p. 182) to Daniel Armstrong for the automobile
was thus an error and gave Daniel a double recovery.
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Finally, the Complaint only alleged that the Plaintiffs suffered personal injuries.
See R. at 1-3. The damage to the automobile was not raised by Plaintiffs until the
damages hearing of October 16, 2000, and Defendant's counsel objected to the
introduction of any evidence regarding the loss of the vehicle. R. 578 at p. 41. The
introduction of that subject was prejudicial and was not tried by express or implied
consent. The trial court's award of $27,357.49 to Daniel for damages to Lorene's
vehicle should therefore be reversed.
II.

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding General Damages to Daniel
Armstrong Because Daniel Armstrong Did Not Meet Any of the
Threshold Required bv U.C.A. § 31 A-22-309m and He Was Not
Therefore. Entitled to Recover Any General Damages.

The trial court also erred in awarding $10,000 in general damages to Daniel
Armstrong because Daniel did not meet any of the threshold requirements necessary to
pursue and recover any amount for general damages as provided in Chapter 22 of the
Utah Insurance Code. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 prohibits an individual from
maintaining a cause of action for general damages in connection with personal injuries
sustained in an automobile accident unless that individual has met at least one of the
following threshold damage requirements:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) (1999).
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A.

The Aggravation of Daniel Armstrong's Preexisting Back Injury Was Not
a Permanent Injury Based Upon Objective Findings.

Daniel did not die, was not dismembered, was not permanently disfigured, and did
not have medical expenses in excess of $3,000 as a result of the accident with Pickett.
He could therefore only be entitled to an award of general damages if he was
permanently disabled or impaired "based upon objective findings" as required by Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(c). There were, however, no objective findings in the
record that Daniel was permanently disabled or impaired as a result of the January 1996
accident.
The trial court merely found that the accident had aggravated Daniel's pre-existing
back injury. R. at 552, f 8. Furthermore, the court did not find that the aggravation
constituted a permanent disability or impairment over and above the pre-existing injury
"based upon objective findings." The court's award of $10,000 in general damages to
Daniel was therefore contrary to the requirements of Utah law and should be overturned.
The Utah statute in question requires "objective findings" of permanent
impairment. This generally means findings by medical specialists. SeeRushton v. Gelco
Express, 732 P.2d 109, 112 (Utah 1986) (affirming Industrial Commission's decision to
adopt findings of medical specialists that worker's compensation claimant did not suffer
permanent partial disability in spite of claimant's subjective claims regarding her
injuries); McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah App. 1997) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant in auto accident case where plaintiffs subjective allegations of
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permanent impairment in complaint and deposition failed to meet objective standard
because no medical evidence was presented). In this case, however, the finding of
aggravation was supported solely by Daniel's self serving and subjective testimony.
There was no medical testimony whatsoever that Daniel had sustained any injury to his
low back from the accident.
The evidence in the record regarding the aggravation of Daniel's injury fails to
meet a minimum evidentiary standard, let alone, an objective standard required by the
statute. A few of Daniel's medical records submitted in this case demonstrated that
Daniel may have experienced back pain, but do not connect it to the January 7, 1996
accident. The only evidence on the nature and extent of the aggravation of Daniel's back
injury was his own subjective testimony at the damages hearing of October 16, 2000 and
in his deposition of October 9, 2000. In both instances, Daniel presented a subjective
account of the problems he experienced with his back before and after January 7, 1996.
For example, he related that "[he] had previously had an injury to the lower back and it
would wake [him] up about 3:30-4:00. [After the accident] it was waking [him] up at
2:00." R. at 578, p. 30 (Damages Hearing). He also related that prior to the January,
1996 accident, he exercised two or three times a week to relieve his back pain, but that
after the accident, he would "have to do [exercises] every day, many times." Id. at 33.
However, NO expert medical testimony or opinion at all was presented at the
Damages Hearing to support the notion that the January 1996 accident had resulted in
any back pain and nothing can be found elsewhere in the record that would support a
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finding that Daniel was permanently impaired or disabled by the accident. Moreover, the
medical records in evidence are inconsistent with Daniel's testimony because they fail to
show that he experienced any back problems following the accident.
Daniel's Emergency Room records from the day of the accident do not contain
any treatment for or complaints of low back pain following the accident. Plaintiffs
Exhibit 1; Tab D at Bate Stamp pp. 83-88. Furthermore, the day after the accident
Daniel saw his family physician, Dr. Scott Smith, and was treated for:
(a)

tenderness over lower rib cage and over right flank;

(b)

blood in his urine;

(c)

tenderness over the left neck muscles; and

(d)

pain in his strap, trapezius and rhomboid muscles.

He did not, however, receive any treatment for, or voice any complaints about, low back
pain. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab D at Bate Stamp p. 93 (January 8, 1996, entry). A little
less than three weeks later, Daniel returned to Dr. Scott Smith, complaining of mild
headaches, shoulder and neck aches but never mentioned low back pain. [Id. (entry for
January 27, 1996)]. From January 27, 1996, through May 11, 2000, Daniel saw Dr. Scott
Smith on ten occasions for many concerns and problems, but there is absolutely no
mention whatsoever that he ever sought treatment for, or voiced complaints of, low back
pain resulting from the accident. [Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab D at Bate Stamp pp. 92-97.
It is undisputed that Daniel had previously suffered a severe low back injury five
or six years before this accident. The existence of that injury is evidenced in Plaintiffs
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Exhibit 1, Tab D Bate Stamp p. 97 of Dr. Smith's records, where it indicates Daniel's
back pain from an old injury was exacerbated by a horseback ride, and he was diagnosed
with possible disc disease.
Evidence of the severity of Daniel's pre-existing low back injury is also contained
in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab P (Daniel Armstrong's medical records from Cottonwood
Hospital and Medical Center). The evidence there shows that, on admission for an
appendectomy in 1993, Daniel personally advised the medical professionals that he had
been involved in a car accident in 1990 "with a L5/S1 disc crushed." Plaintiffs Exhibit
1, Tab P, Bates Stamp p. 522. Additionally, his Patient History Questionnaire which he
personally filled out on that visit relates that he was already experiencing problems
sleeping caused by back pain after lying for just three to four hours. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1,
Tab P Bates Stamp p. 545.
The first and only recorded indication that Daniel experienced any different back
pain after the accident at issue in this case occurred in November of 1997, where it was
self reported, when he went to LDS Hospital for an MRI Scan of his lumbar spine over
twenty-two months after this accident. At that time he described "back pain down the
right leg, moderate for one year." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab D at p. 103. Even pursuant
to his own account given at that time, he was free from any new pain for at least ten
months following the accident.
Although the record supports a finding that Daniel had a pre-existing back injury,
it contains no evidence, other than his unsupported testimony at the damages hearing and
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at his deposition, which connects his back pain, following January 7, 1996, to the
accident at the heart of this dispute. Because neither Daniel's subjective testimony, nor
the medical evidence in the record, constitutes evidence of permanent impairment or
disability based upon objective findings, Daniel should not recover any amount for
general damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309.
B.

The Statutory Threshold Limitations of the PIP Statute Provided Pickett
with Tort Immunity for Dan Armstrong's Claims for General Damages.

The trial judge erred in holding that the threshold limitations of Utah Code Ann. §
31A-22-309 were an affirmative defense "stricken through [Pickett's] default." R. 578
Transcript at 19. This statute unequivocally states that a person who is required to have
personal injury protection coverage for automobile accidents "may not maintain a cause
of action for general damages" unless his injuries are sufficiently serious or his medical
bills are over $3,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a)-(e) (emphasis added).
By its clear terms, the statue absolutely prohibits an action for general damages when its
requirements are not met.
This court has held that when interpreting a statute, "primary goal is to give effect
to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Evans
v. State, 963 P.2d 1777, 184 (Utah 1998). The plain language of the statute is the best
evidence of the legislature's intent. State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1995).
Because § 31A-22-309(l)(a)-(e) clearly, unequivocally, and absolutely prohibits a
plaintiff from bringing a cause of action for general damages unless he can make the
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required showing of serious injury or medical expenses over $3,000, its command is
more than merely an affirmative defense.
The trial court's holding vitiated the statute and circumvented its purpose by
prohibiting Pickett's counsel from raising it at the damages hearing. In enacting §
31A-22-309 the legislature intended to
. . . effectuate certain savings in, the rising costs of automobile accident
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling
the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out of automobile
accidents, these being those not involving great amounts of damages.
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, ch. 55, § 2, 1973 Utah Laws 141.
Allowing the Armstrongs to pursue claims for general damages without first
requiring them to prove that they had met the threshold requirements of § 31A-22-309,
would set a precedent that encourages precisely the evil that the legislature meant to cure:
mounting litigation costs that drive up the price of insurance. If, merely, by virtue of a
defendant's default, a party can maintain a cause of action for general damages, in
contravention of the statute, then plaintiffs' attorneys will be encouraged to bring cases
to court that would not make any economic sense in the absence of the possibility that a
defendant will default.
At first glance it might appear that, apart from the unjust and potentially
financially devastating impact on individual defendants, default judgments for general
damages from minor motor vehicle accidents would not have a tremendous societal
impact. Careful consideration of all the potential issues, however, raises serious
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concerns regarding the potential obligations of the insurer providing underinsured and
uninsured motorist protection benefits to plaintiffs. Must they step in and defend the
unrepresented parties to avoid a default judgment? Would they be bound by such a
judgment? If so, when? If not, under what circumstances? If the trial court's decision in
this case is allowed to stand, insurance companies will waste legal resources defending
against lawsuits where actual damages are minimal, but lawsuits seek huge general
damages based merely on the possibility that defendants will default. In order to protect
consumers from rising insurance costs that would result from this practice, this court
should hold that the statute is an absolute bar to claims for general damages when at least
one of the threshold requirements is not met and it is not an affirmative defense that must
be asserted in a defendant's pleading.
In a rather comprehensive discussion of PIP benefits this court has held "under
[Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309], first party PIP benefits up to the amounts provided in
Section 6 are paid to an injured person without regard to fault. Furthermore, the injured
party is precludedfrommaintaining an action to recover general damages (all damages
other than those awarded for economic losses), [footnote omitted] except where the
threshold requirements of Section 9(1) are met." Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1200
(UT 1980) (emphasis added). This court went on to hold that "if a party has the security
required under Section 5, the no-fault insurance act confers two privileges: first, he is
granted partial tort immunity; second, he is not personally liable for the benefits provided
under Section 6. He does, however, remain liable for customary tort claims, viz., general
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damages and economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid under Section 6,
where the threshold provisions of Section 9(1) are met." Id. See also Bear River Mut
Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978 P.2d 460.
In the instant case Pickett complied with the financial security requirements of
Utah's Motor Vehicle code and he, therefore, should enjoy the privileges of "partial tort
immunity" for general damages where the Plaintiffs do not meet the threshold
requirements of U.C.A. 31A-22-309(l) andfreedomfromliability for Section 6 benefits.
C.

Even if the PIP Threshold Limitations Do Not Apply, the Evidence Does
Not Support the General Damage Award to Dan Armstrong.

The trial court erred in awarding $10,000.00 in general damages to Daniel
because he did not present any objective medical evidence that made a causal connection
between his post- January 7,1996 back pain and the accident that is the subject of this
appeal. In all but the most simplistic personal injury scenarios, the testimony of lay
witnesses is insufficient to demonstrate the nature, cause, and extent of an injury or the
need for specific medical treatment. Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 Utah App. 285 \ 16,
12 P.3d 1015. Further, the "'diagnosis and potential continuance of a disease are
medical questions to be established by physicians as expert witnesses and not by lay
persons.'" Id., (citing Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516, 352 S.E. 2d
832,834(1987).
In Beard, Darlene Beard sued K-Mart after being accidentally struck in the head
by a K-Mart employee. She claimed that neck and wrist surgeries were necessary after
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the accident. At the close of her case, K-Mart unsuccessfully moved for a partial directed
verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show a causal connection between
the K-Mart accident and the surgeries. In reversing the trial court's denial of the directed
verdict for K-Mart, the Utah Court of Appeals found that "[n]o expert medical testimony
was received that the neck and wrist surgeries were necessitated by her accident." Id. at
f 20. In his testimony, Beard's surgeon was not willing to say that the K-Mart accident
was, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the cause of the neck (bone spurs)
and wrist (carpal tunnel syndrome) problems that required surgery. Id. at tf 18-20.
Instead, he conceded that Beard's neck and wrist problems pre-existed the accident, and
that heredity, wear and tear, gravity, and other stresses of Beard's life could have caused
such problems. Id.
Similarly, in the case on appeal, Daniel was suffering from preexisting back
problems at the time of the January 7, 1996 accident. No medical testimony or other
medical evidence was presented that established, to a reasonable medical probability,
that the accident was the source of the back pain Daniel claimed to experience after the
accident. Under the holding of Beard, Daniel's subjective testimony that his pain was
different after the accident than before was, by itself, insufficient to establish that the
accident was the cause of his pain. Evidence of a causal relationship between the
January 7, 1996 accident and Daniel's subsequent back pain was needed from an expert
witness. Because Daniel had preexisting back pain, the question of this relationship
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raised complicated medical issues that could not be resolved by the trial court without the
help of expert medical evidence.
Furthermore, as demonstrated above, Daniel's medical records flatly contradict his
subjective allegations. The medical records he submitted at the damages hearing
[Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tabs E and P] do not show that he experienced any new and
qualitatively different back pain after the January 7,1996 accident until November of
1997, almost two years later, when he went to LDS Hospital for an MRI Scan of his
lumbar spine. The trial court's award of $10,000 in general damages to Daniel,
therefore, had no basis in reasonable medical probability, and should be reversed.
HI.

Jared's Scars Were Not Permanently Disfiguring and He, Therefore, is
Not Entitled to Any General Damages.

The trial court also erred in awarding $10,000 in general damages to Jared
because he failed to show that he met any of the threshold requirements for general
damages as provided in Chapter 22 of the Utah Insurance Code. As stated above, Utah
Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l) prohibits an individual from maintaining a cause of action
for general damages in connection with personal injuries sustained in an automobile
accident unless that individual has met at least one of the following threshold damage
requirements: (a) death; (b) dismemberment; (c) permanent disability or permanent
impairment based upon objective findings; (d) permanent disfigurement; or (e) medical
expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) (1999).
Jared, however, did not meet any of those threshold requirements.
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The Evidence Does Not Support the General Damages Awarded to Jared
Armstrong.
Jared did not die, was not dismembered, was not permanently impaired or disabled
in the January 7, 1996 traffic accident. He did, however, sustain some permanent
scarring that could not be corrected by surgery. Thus, he would be entitled to general
damages only upon a showing that those scars constituted a ''permanent disfigurement"
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l).
The issue this court must address generally is whether any scarring at all, however
minor or inconspicuous constitutes "permanent disfigurement" and specifically, whether
Jared's scars permanently disfigured him. Because Jared did not testily at the Damages
Hearing and the only evidence of the scarring is in the photographs found at Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 1 at Bate Stamp pp.148 and Exhibit to Jared's Deposition at Tab U, this court
can easily determine whether his scarring constitutes "permanent disfigurement."
When faced with a question of statutory construction, Utah courts "look first to
the plain language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520
(Utah 1997) (citations omitted). "[Courts] presume that the legislature used each word
advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted).
Dictionary definitions are often used to interpret statutory tenns. See, e.g. Zoll&
Branch, P.C. v. Asay 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997); CountyBd. of Equalization of
Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Com% 927 P.2d 176, 179 (Utah 1996). The

37

following three dictionary definitions of "disfigure', then, may help to clarify what the
legislature meant by "disfigurement" in § 31A-22-309(l)(d):
To mar or spoil the appearance or shape of; deform.
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Fourth Edition (2000).
http://www.bartleby.com/61/72/D0267200.html.
To impair (as in beauty) by deep and persistent injuries.
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) p. 362.
To spoil completely the appearance of (esp. a person's face)
Cambridge Dictionary of American English Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/.
From these definitions it is clear that the term "disfigure" is associated with
deformity, deep injury, and complete spoilage. However, a statute "should be construed
as a whole, with all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and
with the overall legislative objective of the statute," the general context should be
controlling. Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). See also
State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (stating "a fundamental rule
of statutory interpretation requires that a statute 'be looked at in its entirety and in
accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished* " (citation omitted).
Viewed in light of this principle, the context in which the phrase "permanent
disfigurement" occurs in the statute clears up any ambiguity regarding the legislature's
intent. Parts (a), (b) and (c) of § 31A-22-309(l) enumerate "death", "dismemberment",
"permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings" before
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going on to list "(d) permanent disfigurement" as the fourth threshold requirement. The
general context of § 31A-22-309(l), then, evinces a general theme of serious and
devastating injuries rather than mere blemishes.
The record demonstrates that the two scars Jared received from January 7, 1996
are not seriously disfiguring, nor have they had a devastating impact on him. See
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp pp. 119-120 and 122 (Pioneer Valley Hospital
records). Five months after the accident Jared had surgery to revise four small scars:
three on his left jaw line and one on the left side of his neck, the dimensions of which
were 8 x 5mm; 9 x 4mm; lOx 4mm; and 4 x 9mm. It is unclear from the evidence in this
case what portion of those surgical costs were to revise the scars received in this accident
and what portion was to revise his other scars. Three photographs appear in the record
and provide all the evidence used by the trial court to determine Jared's damages: two at
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 148 and one attached as an exhibit to the Telephone
Deposition of Jared Troy Armstrong, October 9, 2000. The first two appear to be taken
from an angle below the jaw line, and the third appears to represent a close up, with the
skin stretched up over the jaw line to emphasize the scar's appearance. The scars along
the jaw line that can definitely be attributed to the accident do not appear to be in an area
that is readily visible from the photographs, and they are sufficiently small that they
would not ordinarily attract attention.
When asked, at his deposition, how the scars affected him, Jared replied, "I just
look in the mirror and I see them, and I wish they weren't there." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1,
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Tab U at p. 8 lines 6-7. This was the only direct testimony by Jared concerning the effect
the scars have had upon him. The only other evidence that could support the trial court's
award of damages was hearsay testimony from Jared's mother that sometimes girls he
dated would notice the scars and sometimes they would not R. at 578, p. 73, lines 16-22,
and the plastic surgeon's record that, upon admission for surgery, Jared felt that the scars
looked like "big zits." R. at Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 140 (Records of Jed R.
Bindrup, M.D., June 10, 1995).
In light of the insignificance of the scars, their location, the minimal evidence
presented to substantiate that they permanently disfigured Jared or even had a deleterious
impact on his life, the trial court's award of $10,000 in general damages should be
overturned. The scars do not meet the requirement of "permanent disfigurement" as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l). Alternatively, even if the threshold does
not bar recovery, the minimal evidence regarding the affect of the scarring upon Jared's
life cannot support such a large award of general damages.
IV.

The Trial Court's Award of $350.000 in General Damages to Tavlor
Armstrong Was Based on Speculation and Conjecture.

The trial court erred in finding that Taylor's brain injury would "in all probability,
limit his success in college and obtaining one of the higher paying jobs in our economy,"
that "he will always be behind in his development in relation to his peers." R. at 555, f
40 and 556, f 42. While Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Erin Bigler, made general statements
about possible effects of brain injuries on children generally, Taylor's own school
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records and scholastic achievement tests show no evidence that he is currently suffering
from any such effects and do not support an award of $350,000 for his general damages
or future losses.
The evidence regarding the magnitude and impact of Taylor's alleged brain injury
consists of the testimony of his parents; Taylor's emergency room records; a report,
deposition testimony and testing of an expert witness in neuropsychiatry who evaluated
Taylor three years and six months after the accident; and Taylor's school and scholastic
aptitude test results. While the testimony of Taylor's parents and Dr. Bigler tend to show
that Taylor sustained a mild traumatic brain injury8 in the January 7, 1996 accident,
Taylor's subsequent performance in school and on standardized tests do not support the
trial court's finding that Taylor's brain injury will "in all probability, limit his success in
college and obtaining one of the higher paying jobs in our economy," or that "he will
always be behind in his development in relation to his peers."
While Dr. Bigler made generalized and blanket statements regarding the effects of
closed-head injuries upon children when he testified that,
[w]e have three areas where there are typical problems with children who
have had a head injury. One is increased neuropsychiatric. What that
means is, there are higher frequencies of depression-anxiety type disorders
and stress disorders that occur in individuals who have had a head injury.

According to Dr. Bigler, loss of consciousness and "post-traumatic amnesia" are
definitive indicia of a brain injury. See Plaintiff s Exhibit 1, Bates Stamp p. 427. They are not,
however, definitive indicators of a permanent injury or future problems. SeeT>r. Bigler's
testimony regarding Taylor's future.
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The second is that there is increased risk for learning disabilities and
learning problems in kids who have had a head injury.
And the last is-not necessarily meeting the level or standard of
neuropsychiatry disorder where there is actual treatment for anxiety,
depression, stress-but kids with head injury tend to be more impulsive,
problems with judgment, problem with ability to sustain attention and
concentration.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at Bate Stamp pp. 439, lines 11-25, 440 line 1. Dr. Bigler
could not say, however, testify with any degree of certainty, or even probability, what the
future impact of the injury upon Taylor would be. Dr. Bigler testified as follows:
Q:

Do you know what Taylor's permanent problems are going to be at
this point in time?

A:

I don't know exactly what Taylor's problems will be. As a group,
children who have these problems can end up with less education,
end up with less job sophistication.

Q:

Can you say whether Taylor will end up there? Do you have an
opinion about that?

A:

I can't tell you that.

Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at Bate Stamp p. 453.
Dr. Bigler was also asked:
Q:

So it's your understanding when you saw [Taylor] in 1999 he was
worse off, mentally, than he was before the accident?

A:

Well, no. You have to be careful how you say that, because even
though he was behind, he was still at second-grade level, which is ..
. He wasn't in the second grade when he had the head injury.
So, you know, it was not that he was worse, but he was behind
where he should be, given his age.
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Q:

So let me see if I understand this correctly: It's your opinion that the
accident caused him to move backwards and get behind where he was?

A:

His age-made peer; that's correct.

Q:

And then his progression from that point is he's remained behind his peers,
but continued to progress?

A:

Correct.

Q:

And that will continue in the future?

A:

We know, regardless of whether this is a brain injury or idiopathic learning
disability, that certain skills do get better over time. They may stay behind,
and they may plateau earlier than what is normally the case, but they
usually do get better until somewhere in mid-puberty; and then you have
this absolute leveling off, and a plateau that is reached that is
insurmountable thereafter.

Q:

And there's no way to tell what that plateau will be for Taylor?

A:

Well, there is.

Q:

Right Now?

A:

Not right at this point. I mean, you really, truly, have to follow these kids
for several years, to be absolutely definitive of where that's going.

Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab M at pp. 455-456.
Because Dr. Bigler could not testify about the magnitude or impact of Taylor's
claimed injury, it was pure speculation by the trial court that caused it to award him
general damages of $350,000. In the case of Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d
598, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a case where the Plaintiff had not
met his burden of proof regarding causation. It held "[w]hen the proximate cause of an
injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law." Id. at 601 (citing Mitchell
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v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985) and Staheli v. Farmers'Co-op. ofS.
Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 684 (Utah 1982)). In the instant case there is a total absence of
evidence about Taylor's future condition. Any award for his future condition, therefore,
would not be supported by admissible evidence and would be based upon pure
speculation. Plaintiff had the burden of proof regarding Taylor's injury and failed to
meet it.
Furthermore, Taylor's scholastic records belie Dr. Bigler's speculative statements
that Taylor would even fall into the same categories as children with traumatic brain
injuries. See Plaintiff s Exhibit 1, Tab R, Bate Stamp pp. 582-606. The records do
indicate that shortly after the accident Taylor was behind in reading during the first
grade. Thereafter, however, they show that Taylor made good progress in school, and
that he was average or above average in every aspect of his elementary school education
at the time of the trial court's judgment. See Taylor's overall scholastic record,
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab R at Bate Stamp p. 584; his second, third, and fourth grade
report cards at Bate Stamp pp. 594, 595, and 596; his Student Assessment Profile for
reading and verbal skills at Bate Stamp pp. 598 (July 1997); 602 (July 10, 1998); p. 604
(June 30, 1999); and his SAT results of an October 1999 test at Bate Stamp p. 606.
Because Plaintiffs failed to produce any admissible evidence regarding the nature
or magnitude of Taylor's brain injury on him, or that it caused him to be "permanently
disabled" the trial court's award of general damages should be overturned.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Judgments against Pickett and in favor of
Daniel Armstrong, Jared Armstrong and Taylor Armstrong should be duly modified to
comply with Utah Code Ann. §31 A-22-309(l) and the evidence which was before the
trial court when it made its decision.
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ADDENDA
The Addenda required by Rule 24(11), Utah R. App. P. would make this Brief
unreasonably thick and the Addenda to this Brief, therefore, have been bound as a
separate document which is being submitted herewith.
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